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Discussion of ‘Motives for disclosure and 
non-disclosure: a review of the evidence’ 
Ken Lever* 
1. Basic thrust of Professor Lundholm’s 
Paper 
The argument put forward by Professor Lundholm 
is that the primary purpose of voluntary disclo- 
sures emanating from a firm is to minimise the ad- 
verse selection caused by investors who, absent 
such disclosures, are sceptical about the firm’s fu- 
ture prospects. 
It is suggested that full disclosure breaks down 
when frictions enter the picture. Frictions are cate- 
gorised as arising when: management does not 
know; when management cannot tell and when 
management does not care. 
I . I .  Management does not know 
This can arise where managers do not know any- 
thing more than what is required in mandatory dis- 
closures or where something is known with such 
great uncertainty that legal worries or accounting 
principles prevent them from providing the disclo- 
sures. 
I .2. Management cannot tell 
This can arise where it costs money to create and 
disseminate a credible disclosure and it is suspect- 
ed that other parties privy to the disclosure use the 
information to the detriment of the company mak- 
ing the disclosure. 
I .3. Management does not care 
This can arise where managers are not trying to 
maximise the current share price. It may also be 
that the level of concern for the current price varies 
across managers and time periods. 
Chronicling how the costs and benefits change 
as frictions are introduced into the basic story is 
the purpose of the paper. 
The conclusion of the paper is that empirical ev- 
idence shows that firms and the capital market 
seem to respond to their environment in a way that 
is broadly consistent with a basic full disclosure 
model and attendant frictions that alter the model’s 
full disclosure prediction. 
*The author is chief financial officer. Tomkins plc. E-mail: 
klever@tomkins.co.uk 
2. A company perspective in practice 
The following comments are based on the experi- 
ence of Tomkins plc and general observations 
about other companies, and are not based on any 
empirical studies. 
2.1. Minimising adverse selection 
Tomkins stated objective is to achieve sustain- 
able growth in economic value through growth in 
after-tax cash flow. The focus is on cash flow 
rather than earnings. It is also recognised that over 
time the objective of management is to create 
value in the business (‘intrinsic value’) and 
through the communication process to endeavour 
to ensure this value is reflected in the external 
(‘perceived value’) of the company. 
Within Tomkins, intrinsic value is monitored 
against perceived value and it would be normal for 
a value gap to exist. Typically, this gap will exist 
either due to management optimism leading to 
overstated intrinsic value or it may be that the mar- 
ket is not in possession of important information - 
either because is cannot be disclosed for legal or 
competitive reasons or management is not aware 
that the information may impact value. 
2.2. Management does not care 
As a general statement, it is unusual that man- 
agers do not care about the share price. The degree 
to which managers’ interests are aligned to the 
shareholders will vary but a significant number of 
managers will have incentive schemes in some 
way linked to the performance of the share price or 
will have direct ownership of shares. 
At Tomkins there is close alignment through an- 
nual bonus schemes based on creation of econom- 
ic value and long-term incentive plans, linked to 
total shareholder returns. 
2.3. Management does not know 
It may be that management does not know any 
more than the financial market in certain areas. For 
example, management may forecast the likely 
trends in its markets, but ultimately management 
may be shown to be incorrect due to factors be- 
yond its control. Management may then be pe- 
nalised by the financial markets even though it was 
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trying to be helpful. While forward-looking infor- 
mation of this type may be helpful to the financial 
markets, there is a reluctance on the part of man- 
agement to give such information if it is seen as a 
stick to beat management subsequently. 
2.4.  Management cannot tell 
Management may in certain situations seek to 
suggest that information cannot be disclosed due 
to commercial sensitivity. These situations should 
generally be unusual and management should be 
able to articulate information about market attrac- 
tiveness and competitive position without giving 
away too many details of the strategy. Ultimately, 
the success of a business is driven by execution of 
its strategy. Seldom will disclosures affect execu- 
tion. 
The categorisation of the frictions may be over 
simplistic and does not take into account the mo- 
tives and drivers of different groups of sharehold- 
ers. For example, hedge funds like to promote 
imperfections in the market to provide opportuni- 
ties short the shares. Short-term share price volatil- 
ity has frequently driven trading by the hedge 
funds, while long-only funds retain investments in 
the shares. 
3. Our information strategy 
At Tomkins, a balanced approach to information 
communication is used to ensure perceived and in- 
trinsic value are aligned as closely as possible and 
so that investors and potential investors are well 
informed about the prospects of the business. 
While the bias of voluntary disclosures tends to 
present the picture in a favourable light, with the 
effect that adverse selection is minimised, it is 
recognised that if communication is seen as spin 
then investors are likely to penalise the valuation 
of the business due to the impact on management 
credibility. 
Information used by management is communi- 
cated externally where possible so that the per- 
formance and prospects of the business can be 
seen ‘through the eyes of management’. 
In addition to required mandatory disclosures 
strategic position, market attractiveness and com- 
petitive position are discussed. 
Considerable importance is attached to non-fi- 
nancial and narrative information to supplement 
and complement financial disclosures. Wherever 
possible, management tries to give a forward-look- 
ing orientation but recognises that the absence of 
safe harbour protection in the UK limits ability to 
make such disclosures extensive. 
Overall, the focus is on understandable informa- 
tion, relevance, supportable, comparability over 
time and transparency. 
3.1. Means of communication 
The principal means of communications are an- 
alysts’ briefings, investor meetings, capital mar- 
kets conferences, the annual report, the operating 
and financial review and the management discus- 
sion and analysis in the US. Use is made of the 
website, live web-casts and printed documents. 
3.2. Effect 
Tomkins has a reputation for transparency, ex- 
tensive disclosure and quality of management. 
Over a six-year period the share price has more 
than doubled despite having disposed of over one 
third of the activities. 
4. Complexity of financial reporting 
Concerns exist that the complexity of the financial 
reporting model is an impediment to communica- 
tion. The move towards a balance sheet concept of 
income and the more extensive use of fair values is 
leading to less transparency. 
An overly complex reporting environment can 
lead to information being misunderstood and may 
provide imperfections in the market which could 
lead to short-term trading by hedge funds and 
volatility in the share price. 
The users require more information on the 
strategic position of the business and extent to 
which this will generate sustainable growth in after 
tax operating cash flow over time. This type of in- 
formation is better presented through narrative and 
qualitative disclosures that would typically be in- 
cluded in an operating and financial review. The 
future development of narrative information will 
be important to a better understanding by the mar- 
ket of the factors that influence value. 
5. Conclusion 
Management’s role is to create economic value in 
the business and to effectively communicate with 
the market. 
Communication with the market should ensure 
the market over the long-term properly assesses 
the intrinsic (economic) value of the business and 
applies a fair valuation and eliminate the value 
gap. It should not be driven solely by the desire to 
avoid adverse selection. 
The suggestion that an investor relations’ func- 
tion takes a sophisticated approach to the assess- 
ment of the type and timing of the release of 
information to the market is somewhat misplaced. 
Generally, there are tried and tested ways of com- 
munication that tend to be applied in a fairly rou- 
tine way by most public corporations. 
There is little to be gained by hyping the market 
in the long-term due to its impact on credibility. 
Ultimately, the market discovers this and will ad- 
just the valuation of the equity. 
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